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Abstract: Health insurance is potentially subject to risk selection, i.e. ad-
verse selection on the part of consumers and cream skimming on the part of in-
surers. Adverse selection models predict that competitive health insurers can
eschew high-risk individuals by o¤ering contracts with low deductibles or co-
payment rates, while attracting low-risk individuals with higher copayments,
resulting in a separating equilibrium. This contribution seeks to determine
whether in competitive Swiss social health insurance policies with deductibles
in excess of the legal minimum do indeed serve as an instrument of risk selec-
tion. In a discrete choice experiment, e¤ected in 2003, some 1,000 individuals
were given the hypothetical choice of alternative insurance contracts that dif-
fered both in terms of deductibles and copayments and in benets covered.
Results suggest that healthy individuals, i.e. those not having consulted med-
ical services during the past six months, were more likely to select a policy
with a high deductible. Compensation demanded for voluntarily accepting an
increase in the annual deductible also varies with socioeconomic characteris-
tics and increases with the current level of deductible, as predicted by theory
and constituting evidence in favor of the risk selection hypothesis. The exper-
iment allows to compute necessary premium reductions and provides guidance
for the pricing policy of insurers when o¤ering di¤erentiated products.
Keywords: health insurance, deductible, copayment, willingness-to-pay, ad-
verse selection
JEL: C35, C93, D61, I11, I18
                    
*University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, Hottingerstr. 10, CH-8032 Zurich,
correspondence to: karolin.becker@soi.unizh.ch
We are indebted to Harry Telser and Rainer Winkelmann (University of Zurich) for
helpful comments and suggestions.
1
1 Introduction
As with all insurance, asymmetric infomation plays a major role in health insurance.
Yet, in most mandatory health insurance schemes insurers are prevented from solving
this problem by o¤ering di¤erentiated contracts (to overcome adverse selection by
inducing a separating equilibrium) or by charging risk-rated premiums (to equalize
expected prot margins across risk types, obviating cream-skimming e¤orts). The
assumption that individuals not only di¤er in their expected future health cost, but
also in their preferences with respect to insurance coverage, is plausible in view
of observed product di¤erentiation in private insurance contracts (Spence, 1978).
However, benet packages in social health insurance are usually regulated to be
uniform for all insured, with premiums either a uniform share of income or per
capita contribution.
In partial contradistinction Swiss funds have, since the introduction of mandatory
health insurance in 1996 (Health Insurance Law, KVG) the possibility of o¤ering
policies that di¤er in terms of cost sharing. They thus can cater to di¤erences in
preferences and attitudes towards risk and in expectations regarding future health
care expenditures (HCE) among the insured population. At the same time, as
of 2004 there is a minimum annual deductible of CHF 300 (1 CHF=0.8 US$ at
2005 exchange rates) and a 10 percent copayment rate on all HCE exceeding this
deductible, up to a maximum amount of CHF 600. Beyond the CHF 300 minimum,
insurers can o¤er higher deductibles (CHF 400, 600, 1,200 and 1,500) in exchange
for lower premiums.
During the rst years since the introduction of the Health Insurance Law, these
options were little used; however, they have become increasingly popular with rising
premiums over the past years (see Table 2). Increased cost sharing should also have
a mitigating e¤ect on moral hazard e¤ects - the other problem burdening insurance,
both private and social, reducing its contribution to social welfare (Zweifel and
Manning, 2000). E¤ective 2005, Swiss health insurers have the right to o¤er addi-
tional deductibles up to a maximum of CHF 2,500 annually, resulting in premium
reductions of up to 50 percent. This deregulation was introduced by the Swiss gov-
ernment in the hope of curbing the cost explosionin health care, which appears to
have caused the health share of GDP to rise from 9 percent in 1996 to an estimated
11.5 percent in 2004.
Models of adverse selection predict that individuals choose the insurance con-
tract that ts their risk type (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Wilson, 1977).
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While information on risk type is private and cannot be observed, the insurer may
succeed to screen the population by letting individuals reveal their risk type through
their choice of insurance contract. In the present case, the level of deductible is hy-
pothesized to serve as the screening device. Thus, high-risk types are expected to
select contracts with low copayment, whereas low-risk types, viz. those of good
health and a low future probability of becoming ill, would tend to choose a higher
copayment. The introduction of di¤erentiated copayments can thus be considered
welfare-improving (Breyer, 1984; Osterkamp, 2003). Moreover, Arrow (1971)
has shown that risk-averse individuals prefer partial over full coverage whenever in-
surance is not actuarially fair. However, cost sharing optimally is in the guise of a
deductible (beyond which coinsurance should be zero unless there are moral hazard
e¤ects (Pauly, 1974)).
The present contribution seeks to determine the extent to which Swiss social
health insurers may use deductibles as an instrument for risk selection. Previous
research had posed the question the other way around, asking whether the sub-
stantial savings achieved by higher-deductible plans indeed reect reduced moral
hazard e¤ects or rather successful selection of favorable risks (Schellhorn, 2001;
Werblow and Felder, 2003; for the case of Managed Care, see Lehmann and
Zweifel, 2004). Thus, this work is more in the spirit of Cutler and Reber
(1998), who investigated the death spiralresulting in the discontinuation of cer-
tain plans o¤ered by Harvard University (the traditional comprehensive planning
having lost most of its low risks). In the Harvard case, however, health insurers had
been passive, while in the present case, Swiss health insurers would have pursued
an active cream-skimming strategy.
For such a strategy to work, however, consumer preferences with regard to health
insurance must be su¢ ciently diverse. Diversity of preferences can be established
by measuring willingness-to-pay (WTP) for hypothetical contractual alternatives to
the status quo. Since the pertinent market experiments were performed in 2003,
i.e. at a time when the political debate over increased deductibles was still going
on, some of these alternatives were indeed hypothetical, precluding the inference of
WTP from observed behavior.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to a
literature review concerning health insurance contracts that di¤er in terms of co-
payment. In section 3, an adverse selection model (screening by the insurer that
results in a separating equilibrium) is discussed. In section 4, discrete choice exper-
iments (DCE) are described as the preferred method for measuring WTP for goods
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not available on the market (yet), such as the higher-deductible contracts consid-
ered in 2003. Descriptive results of DCE and a rst analysis of the determinants of
choice are provided in section 5, as well as the full estimation results of the DCE.
WTP values are derived for di¤erent socioeconomic groups to test for preference
heterogeneity. The evidence indeed suggests a higher propensity among the young
and high-income individuals to opt for a higher-deductible contract with compensa-
tion demanded. Therefore, Swiss social health insurers seem to be confronted with
a considerable degree of preference heterogeneity that may make cream skimming
worthwile but also calls for di¤erentiated contracts.
2 Literature review
This section is devoted to a review of the literature on the possibilities of di¤eren-
tiation of copayment in (health) insurance and the role of deductibles in particular.
With symmetric information, risk-averse individuals will purchase policies with
full coverage when insurance is actuarially fair (Mossin, 1968). However, not many
insurance contracts o¤er full coverage. As shown by Arrow (1971), in the pres-
ence of administrative expense the Pareto-optimal contract stipulates a deductible,
beyond which there is no cost sharing. Schlesinger (1981) proves that more risk-
averse individuals and - under certain assumptions - individuals with lower initial
wealth or a higher probability of a loss purchase insurance contracts with lower de-
ductibles. Raviv (1979) shows that a positive rate of copayment is either a result of
risk aversion of insurers or of nonlinearity in insurance costs. However, all of these
results are conditional on the absence of moral hazard.
With moral hazard e¤ects present, deductibles combined with a positive rate
of copayment become optimal (Shavell, 1979). Ellis and McGuire (1990) and
Eggleston (2000) distinguish between demand- and supply-side cost sharing as a
means to control the quantity of health services consumed.
In this paper, the focus lies on cost sharing on the demand side. Previous research
has analyzed various designs of cost sharing in health insurance. A general goal of
a mandatory health insurance is to minimize consumers risk due to unexpected
medical expenditure. Criteria for cost-sharing schemes are thus the variability of
nal income (Breyer, 1984; Osterkamp, 2003) and the severity of the health
condition. Since moral hazard e¤ects may di¤er between types of illness, contracts
should optimally contain di¤erentiated cost-sharing provisions (Nyman, 2003, Ch.
9; Zweifel and Breuer, 2005). The result would be high deductibles for low-
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cost risks and no deductible for catastrophic risks, or di¤erent deductibles for long-
term and emergency cases, respectively (Eeckhoudt, 2002). A di¤erentiation with
respect to the treatment chosen is suggested by Chernew et al. (2000) in order to
give nancial incentives to seek out less costly alternatives and to integrate patients
into decision-making. Another distinction that points in the same direction is made
by van de Voorde et al. (2001) and Schellhorn (2001), who propose di¤erent
deductibles for services provided by general practitioners and specialists.
Asheim et al. (2003) consider not only the risk of HCE but also of income loss
due to illness, raising the question of how individuals with di¤erent (unobserved)
earning capabilities and di¤erent probabilities of falling ill will decide about coverage.
Their analysis relies on the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz model with asymmetric
information, which has a separating equilibrium where low-risk individuals with
high ability choose a contract with copayment and high-risk individuals with low
ability choose no copayment. The authors also analyze a deductible in painwhich
consists in only partial restoration of health as a consequence of settling for a less
costly treatment alternative.
Deductibles have a negative e¤ect on the number of physician and hospital visits.
The RAND Health Insurance Experiment assigned participants to contracts with
di¤erent deductibles to exclude risk selection e¤ects. It found a price elasticity of
 0:2 (Manning et al., 1987; Newhouse, 1996; Ellis, 1995) that was in line with
ndings from earlier studies (Scitovsky and Snyder, 1972).1
Chiappori et al. (1998) beneted from a controlled natural experiment due
to a policy change when some but not all French insured were exposed to a higher
copayment rate on physician visits. Their estimation results do not provide any
evidence for a reduced total number of physician visits among the group facing
the higher copayment rate, suggesting a price elasticity of demand close to zero.
However, demand for home visits decreased, possibly because a change in net money
price translates fully into a change of total price, nonmonetary costs such as travel
and waiting time being negligible in this type of medical service (Acton, 1975).
Schellhorn (2001) also nds that HCE of Swiss individuals that choose a high-
deductible plan are lower. He attributes at least part of the e¤ect to self-selection of
low risks. Indeed, higher age goes along with a lower deductible, whereas income is
not a signicant predictor of contract choice. An analysis of Dutch administrative
1Newhouse (1978) reviews the early literature on cost-sharing e¤ects on the demand for med-
ical care, whereas Rice and Morrison (1994) and Zweifel and Manning (2000) look at more
recent literature on this topic.
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data was conducted by van Vliet (2004) to estimate price sensitivity of demand
for healthcare of di¤erent specialities, nding an overall price elasticity of  0:14,
with  0:40 for general practioners and  0:12 for specialists. In contrast to the
RAND study and Chiappori et al. (1998), this research does not control for the
endogeneity of contract choice. Using Swiss data again, Werblow and Felder
(2003) try to separate moral hazard from risk-selection e¤ects by distinguishing three
stages in the demand for health care services. In the rst stage, individuals select a
deductible, conditional on uncertain future HCE. In the second stage, they decide
on whether or not to consult a physician. In the third stage, intensity of treatment
is determined as an outcome of patient-physician interaction. Taking into account
the endogeneity of contract choice in this way, the authors nd that deductibles still
serve to reduce HCE signicantly.
In sum, both theory and empirical evidence suggest that increased cost shar-
ing contributes to mitigating moral hazard e¤ects in health insurance. However,
part of the observed e¤ect may be due to both adverse selection by consumers and
cream skimming by insurers. A necessary condition for these strategies to occur is
su¢ cient heterogeneity of risk types and/or preferences. Interestingly, apart from
heterogeneity with regard to risk types (see the studies of Schellhorn (2001) and
Werblow and Felder (2003) cited above), there is comparatively little empit-
ical evidence concerning heterogeneity in other dimensions. Courbage and de
Coulon (2005) nd that UK individuals purchasing private health insurance dif-
fer from those remaining within the National Health Service by income, political
orientation, and possibly preventive e¤ort. However, this heterogeneity determines
choice between systems rather than choice within the system, where the imposition
of uniformity risks to burden society with considerable cost in terms of e¢ ciency
losses (Zweifel et al., 2005). The DCE presented in this paper permits to quantify
the extent of heterogeneity with regard to not yet existing health insurance policies
in population.
Conclusion 1 Preference heterogeneity facilitates both adverse selection and cream
skimming in insurance markets with asymmetric information. However, there is
little direct evidence on the actual importance of preference heterogeneity in health
insurance.
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3 Screening and adverse selection: theoretical con-
siderations
This section takes the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz-Model (1976) as the backfoil
which says that the observed holdings of insurance contracts are the outcome of risk
selection by individuals on the one hand and screening e¤orts by insurers on the
other.
On the part of individuals, both preference and risk heterogeneity (the latter
usually emphasized because of possible adverse selection e¤ects) lead to di¤erences
in contract choice. The two reasons cannot be distinguished easily: In health in-
surance, a consumer may opt for comprehensive coverage because of a high degree
of risk aversion (preference) or because of private knowledge about a (high) future
probability of incurring (high) HCE (risk). For Switzerland, there is no denite
evidence with regard to the preference side, e.g. women being more risk averse
than men. To the contrary, a study by Schubert et al. (1999) nds that less
risk-averse choices by Swiss females can be explained by di¤erences in budget con-
straints rather than preferences. On the risk side, marked socioeconomic di¤erences
both in the likelihood of positive HCE and the amount of HCE have been found
(see e.g. Zweifel et al., 1999 or Zweifel, 1985), and it is credible to assume that
individuals are at least to some extent aware of them. Therefore, risk heterogeneity
(and possibly preference heterogeneity) are expected to be determinants of contract
choice in Swiss health insurance. The results of the DCE reported in section 5 below
seek to establish such heterogeneity, albeit without discriminating between its two
sources.
On the part of insurers, risk heterogeneity is of course the raison dêtre for
implementing cream-skimming strategies. However, to the extent that preferences
correlate with risk, preference heterogeneity is also important for the success of
such strategies. For example, preference for a neighborhood with low environmental
quality may serve as a signal of high future probability of incurring (high) HCE,
triggering the infamous red lining. However, the more precisely health insurers
can scale their premiums to risk, the less incentive they have to engage in cream
skimming (Pauly and Herring, 1999; Zweifel and Breuer, 2005). Conversely,
regulation imposing community rating makes this incentive strong. It still may
be mitigated by the risk of backring on the cream-skimming insurer (Wilson,
1977). Competitors who become insolvent because they are ooded by high risks
will unloadthem back on their successful competitor.
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Spence (1978) analyzes such a competitive insurance market, where insurers
react to the products o¤ered by their competitors, and considers i = 1; ::; n discrete
risk types (with loss probabilities i > i+1; thus type i causes higher costs than type
i+ 1) and their risk preferences. As in the Rothschild-Stiglitz-case, preferences are
not observable, making product di¤erentiation attractive for screening individuals.
This formulation seems to be a fair description of Swiss social health insurance with
its many insurers each o¤ering several contracts with respect to cost sharing or
Managed-Care elements. This diversication may well provide an instrument for
risk selection.
Figure 1
Product differentiation on an insurance market
Source: Spence (1978).
A
xY
B
z'Y
A
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risk types
0
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Figure 1 illustrates the situation of insurer A o¤ering three di¤erent contracts,
	A = (	Ax ;	
A
y ;	
A
z ) each subsuming a group of similar types. On the vertical axis,
pi   iL denotes the expected prot for the insurer, with pi denoting the insur-
ance premium and iL; the expected loss of individual i. Within contracts, cross-
subsidization is allowed, describing a realistic feature of an insurance market. The
best risks within each contract agree on paying a premium that is marginally
higher than their expected losses. In terms of risk preferences, their compensation
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demanded for accepting risk (in the guise of cost sharing) is lower than it would
be in the case of a perfectly separating equilibrium with individually risk-adjusted
premiums. This commitment avoids the very bad risk (or very risk-averse) types
migrating to the contract tailored to the subpopulation to which these bestrisks
pertain. In Figure 1, this could be a move from contract 	Ay (written by A for a
subpopulation y) to 	Az (targeted to subpopulation z, with E(HCEz) < E(HCEy)).
Insurers thus realize a negative prot on some individuals within a policy, viz. those
that have high but not high enough E(HCE) to qualify for the next contract
with a lower deductible and a higher premium. Since there are protable and non-
protable individuals within one policy, there is an incentive for a competitor B to
cream skim and o¤er a contract 	Bz0 that only attracts protable individuals. Insurer
A cannot cross-subsidize the worserisks within contract 	Az any longer, causing it
to withdraw this contract from the market. The individuals on the interval [kb; kc]
(i.e. those yielding negative expected prots) must now search for a new contract,
which induces competitors to adjust their o¤ers.
Still, cream skimming may turn out not to be feasible. Already in the Rothschild-
Stiglitz case of just high and low risks, separating contracts may fail. If high proba-
bility of positive HCE does not go along with high amounts of HCE, because if those
who often see the doctor often submit petty claims, attracting the right individuals
to the right policies already becomes di¢ cult. In addition, there are usually far more
than two categories to be distinguished. Finally, there is a considerable likelihood of
transition in that a low risk may become a high one and vice versa, a consideration
of importance to any insurer whose planning horizon extends beyond one period, a
year, say (see Zweifel and Breuer, 2005).
In the case of Switzerland, social health insurers, while competing with pre-
miums, must charge a uniform premium for all adults of a dened local market
(often coincident with a Canton). This constitutes a strong incentive for risk se-
lection. A recent Swiss study indeed found that up to two-thirds of the savings
achieved by Managed-Care alternatives were due to risk selection e¤ects (Lehmann
and Zweifel, 2004). It is highly unlikely that these risk selection e¤ects could be
traced to consumer behavior in their entirety; after all, these alternatives had to be
developed and launched by insurers. These considerations provide the basis for the
hypothesis to be tested in this paper, viz. that policies with increased cost sharing
in Swiss health insurance may attract consumers with certain preferences and risk
proles, thus serving as an instrument for risk selection.
Conclusion 2 While adverse selection by individuals can be expected to be relevant
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in the Swiss market for social health insurance, there are reasons to expect cream-
skimming e¤orts by insurers, which could prot from preference heterogeneity using
di¤erentiated deductible levels of cost sharing.
4 Discrete-choice experiments
4.1 Theoretical background
Based on random utility theory (Luce, 1959; Manski and Lerman, 1977; Mc-
Fadden, 1981 and 2001), discrete choice experiments (DCE) are designed to allow
individuals to express their preferences for non-marketed goods or goods which do
not yet exist. The number of applications of DCE to the valuation of healthcare
programs has increased during the past few years (see Ryan and Gerard, 2003 for
an overview; Scanlon et al., 1997). In a DCE individuals are given a hypothetical
choice between many or just two (binary choice) commodities. From the trade-o¤s
respondents implicitly make between the di¤erent attributes of the product, the re-
searcher can derive the (expected) utility associated with product characteristics.
By including a cost or price attribute, the monetary valuation of the remaining
product attributes can be computed. Biases that might occur when individuals are
asked about their WTP directly (as in Contingent Valuation) are less likely to be
observed in DCE (Ryan, 2004).
The rst step of a DCE involves the denition of the attributes of the commodity
and the levels assigned to them (Louviere et al., 2000; Ryan and Gerard, 2003).
In the present case of Swiss health insurance, attributes that currently are in the
political debate were chosen to describe the di¤erent benet packages (for more
details, see Table 1),
 variation in the annual deductible;
 di¤erent levels of copayment;
 variation in coverage of treatment methods in alternative medicine;
 variation in the drug benet;
 variation in access to innovative treatments;
 variation in the premium as a result of these extensions or limitations of ben-
ets (this constitutes the price attribute).
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Table 1
Product attributes and levels in the main survey
Attribute Label Levels
Deductible deductible - Status quo: CHF 230, 400, 600, 1200, 1,500 per year
- CHF 0, 2,400, 4,800 per year
Copayment copayment - Status quo: 10%, maximum level of CHF 600 annually (=0)
- 20%, maximum level of CHF 1,200 annually (=1)
Alternative medicine altmed - Status quo: some treatment methods are covered (=0)
- Fewer alternative treatment methods are covered (=1)
- More alternative treatment methods are covered (=-1)
Generics generics - Status quo: all drugs on the list are reimbursed (=0)
- the cheapest product on the market is covered (=1)
Innovation innovation - Status quo: all treatment methods are covered as soon as they get approved (=0)
- innovative treatment methods are covered only three years after introduction (=1)
Premium premium - Increase of the monthly premium by CHF 50, 25 or 10
- Reduction of the monthly premium by CHF 50, 25 or 10
These six attributes and their levels combine for a very large number (768 pos-
sible combinations) of choice sets. Using statistical design optimization procedures
(Kuhfeld et al., 1994; Hardin and Sloane, 1993 and 1994), their number was
reduced to 27 and randomly split into three groups. One choice was included twice
in each choice set for testing of consistency (Ryan and Bate, 2001), resulting in
10 choices per person. Each of the 10 alternatives had to be evaluated against the
status quo insurance contract.
As a rational subject, a respondent will choose the alternative with the higher
level of utility. The decision making process within a DCE can thus be seen as a
comparison of utility values Vij,
Vij = v [bj; pj;yi; si;"ij] (1)
where v [] represents the value of the indirect utility function of an individual for
an insurance contract with a vector of attributes bj and a premium denoted by pj.
The income of individual i is yi, the sociodemographic characteristics are denoted
by si, and the error term by "ij.
With an additive error term, the individual will choose contract j over contract
l if
w [bj; pj; yi; si] + "ij  w [bl; pl; yi;si] + "il (2)
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Here, wi [] is the deterministic component of the utility that can be estimated,
while the error terms reect unobservable factors that vary with the individual and
the alternatives. The utility function w() can be inferred from observed choices by
assuming that the probability Pij of choosing alternative j over l, given the vector of
attributes, equals the probability of the di¤erence in utilities given in (2) occurring.
Therefore,
Pij = Pr (w [bj; pj; yi; si] + "ij  w [bl; pl; yi;si] + "il) (3)
Rearranging this inequality into a stochastic and a deterministic part leads to the
following expression,
Pij = Pr (("ij   "il)  (w [bl; :::]  w [bj; :::])): (4)
Moreover the utility function is usually assumed to be linear2,
vi = ci + 1b1 + 2b2 + :::+ "ij (5)
where ci is a constant, 1; :::K are the parameters to be estimated, and b1;:::bK (K=6
in the present case) are the di¤erent attributes of the commodity. The parameters
1; :::K can be interpreted as the marginal utilities of the attributes; they are
constant in the case of a linear utility function. This rather strong assumption
might not be satised for attributes covering a wide range such as the deductible
or the premium. To test for nonlinearity, quadratic terms of these two regressors
will be included in the empirical specication. The marginal rate of substitution
between two attributes k and m is given by
MRSk;m =   @v=@bk
@v=@bm
; (6)
with the marginal utilities retrieved from the estimated utility function.
The WTP for a specic attribute can thus be calculated by dividing the respec-
tive slope parameter of the indirect utility function by the parameter pertaining to
the price variable (in the present case the monthly premium, reecting the marginal
utility of income3). This ratio then indicates how much income respondents are
2There is empirical evidence that a linear specication leads to good predictions in the middle
ranges of the utility function (Hensher et al., 1999).
3This can be shown by Roys Identity (Telser, 2002, p. 58, ch. 3.4 ). Quantity demanded
equals the negative ratio of partial derivatives of the indirect utility function with respect to price
and income, xj() =  @v()=@pj@v()=@yi . Since the quantity demanded can be set to one (xj = 1) for the
one alternative to be chosen, the expression simplies to @v@yi =   @v@pj : Thus the marginal utility of
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willing to forego in order to get an increased amount of the other attribute.
The model is usually estimated by logit and probit techniques, depending on
the assumption made on the distribution of the error term. Since respondents have
to make several choices, observations have a panel structure, making a random-
e¤ects specication appropriate (for a more detailed explanation, see Louviere et
al., 2000 and Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). Limiting the specication to the
product attributes and excluding already the squared premium variable (premium2)
which proved insignicant, one obtains the following indirect utility function
Vij = ci + 1deduct+ 2deduct
2 + 3copayment+ 4altmed (7)
+5generics+ 6innovation+ 7premium+ "ij:
In the DCE conducted in this study, the dependent variable is (0,1), indicating
whether the individual chooses the alternative or keeps his or her existing contract.
According to the random utility model, the individual evaluates the di¤erence be-
tween the two alternatives presented. For the dummy variables representing co-
payments, alternative medicine, generics, and innovation, this does not require any
adjustments of the variables entering the estimation function. The premium vari-
able is dened as the absolute change in Swiss Francs from the actual contract; it
takes on six discrete values (see Table 1 again). For the deductible, the di¤erence
between the level proposed in the alternative contract and the one in the status quo
contract needs to be entered.
The 'ij are assumed to be normally distributed and to have a random component
structure4 such that
'ij = i + ij; (8)
where i is a stochastic component, varying only with the individual but not across
choices, and i and ij being uncorrelated with the vector of attributes (bi1; :::; biK).
In the probit model, i and ij are assumed to be iid  N(0; ), and iid  N(0; )
respectively, with  = 1 as the standard assumption so that
V ar

'ij

= 2 + 
2
 = 
2
 + 1 (9)
income is equals the negative derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to price.
4Estimating a xed-e¤ects model would necessitate the estimation of individual-specic con-
stants, increasing the number of dummy variables tremendously and thus causing multicollinearity
problems. This would preclude estimation of age and other socioeconomic e¤ects, which are at the
focus of this study.
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and
Corr

'ij; 'ir

:=  =
2
1 + 2
: (10)
Here,  indicates how strongly the di¤erent choices j and r of a given individual
are correlated over the course of the experiment (Greene, 2000, Ch. 19.5). A high
and signicant value of  indicates that the random-e¤ects specication is justied.
Another advantage of the probit model (which is retained in the following) is that
it relaxes the strong IIA (independence of irrelevant alternatives) assumption of the
logit model (Train, 2003; Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985).
4.2 Setup of the study
To test for possible preference heterogeneity of the Swiss residential population con-
cerning their health insurance, a representative telephone survey with 1,000 persons
aged over 255 living in the German- and French-speaking parts of Switzerland was
conducted. The survey, elded during September 2003, was in two steps. In a rst
telephone contact, individuals who agreed to particiate were asked to look up their
personal monthly premium and annual deductible for the compulsory part of their
insurance policy. This information on the status quo is essential for respondents to
be able to make a choice between their current contract and a proposed alterna-
tive. They also were sent a package of information material to make sure that they
had the same infomation on the actual coverage of their policy and the variations
considered in the experiment.6
The second telephone contact was by appointment and consisted of the ques-
tionnaire itself. It started with questions concerning utilization of healthcare ser-
vices, overall satisfaction with the healthcare system, insurer and insurance policy,
and general attitudes toward new elements in the insurance package. Sociodemo-
graphic variables surveyed were age, sex, education, total household income, educa-
tion (seven categories from primary school to university degree), place of residence,
occupation, and marital status.
The DCE was implemented in the second part of the interview. Participants
were asked to compare the status quo, i.e. their current insurance contract, with
10 hypothetical alternatives dened by the six attributes named in section 4.1. The
attributes retained for describing the contracts had been checked in a pretest for
5Below the age of 25 reduced premiums for young adults and children apply.
6See also San Miguel et al. (2005) for the importance of a priori information for choice
consistency in a DCE.
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their relevance, occasioning some adjustments to the deductible attribute, whose
range had to be decreased to avoid protest responses for lack of realism.7 To mitigate
learning or fatigue e¤ects, the order of the choice alternatives was randomly changed
(Merino-Castellò, 2003).
5 Results
5.1 Descriptive statistics
The sample consists of 780 respondents from the German-speaking part of Switzer-
land and 220 of the French-speaking population. One-half of the sample are women,
the other half are men. Other key socioeconomic characteristics in the sample reect
the proportions in the Swiss population. Since health-related issues are debated fre-
quently, 46 percent of the persons interviewed stated very high interest, with a still
higher share among those aged over 65 years. This might reect a selection e¤ect
because people interested in health issues were more likely to participate.
Also, 80 percent of the respondents stated that they currently were in very good
or good health. This distribution correponds closely to the results of the survey
Healthmonitor 2001(gfs, 2001). Considering utilization of medical services during
the past six months, the following answers were given. 28 percent of the sample had
not used any medical service during the past 6 months, 12 percent had been in
hospital, 50 percent had received outpatient care, 21 percent had seen a dentist, 10
percent had consulted a healer, and 39 percent had taken medications. Again these
frequencies accord with the results of the survey Healthmonitor 2001(gfs, 2001).
On average, the interviewed paid a monthly premium of CHF 240 (US$ 192)
for their mandatory health insurance. This average is lower than the CHF 270
(US$ 216) computed for the whole of Switzerland by the Federal Agency for Social
Insurance. This di¤erence can be explained by three factors. First, the o¢ cial
gure includes only the (expensive) contracts with the lowest deductible, whereas the
sample also includes (less expensive) contracts with higher deductibles andManaged-
Care alternatives. Second, the canton Tessin, a canton with traditionally high HCE
and high premiums, was not sampled for this study. Third, the o¢ cial gure includes
contributions to accident insurance, which were excluded here.
The frequencies of the di¤erent annual deductibles are shown in Table 2. With
7For potential di¢ culties with the cost attribute, see Slothuus-Skjoldborg and Gyrd-
Hansen, 2003.
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Table 2
Frequencies of deductible levels in Swiss health insurance (in percent)
Official Health
Insurance Statistics
(2005)b)
Deductibles in CHF Survey (2003)
(N=1000)
Official Health
Insurance Statistics
(1998) a)
Official Health
Insurance Statistics
(2003)
Deduct. %
230 36.1 47.6 41.8 300 45
400 22.4 30.8 22.1 500 28
600 14.3 7.6 10.2 1000 3
1200 2.4 3.2 2.6 1500 18
1500 24.8 3.9 15.0 2000 1
other 0.8 7.0 8.3 2500 5
a) First year with minimum deductible of CHF 230.
b) Preliminary data in the first year with newly introduced deductible levels.
1 CHF=0.8 US$ at 2005 exchange rates.
Source: Federal Agency of Health (2005).
24.8 percent, the highest deductible of CHF 1,500 (US$ 1,200) is over-represented.
According to o¢ cial statistics for 2002, only 15 percent chose the highest level.
However, this share was still lower in 1998, viz. 3.9 percent (BAG, 2005). Therefore,
a tendency towards higher deductibles can be observed, indicating increased pressure
on households to save on premiums or an increasing reection of preferences for more
di¤erentiated contracts. Still, there is the possibility that people who are willing to
take part in a health-related survey are more informed about the di¤erent options
that result in premium reductions. However, over-representation of the maximum
deductible may also be the result of risk selection. Indeed, the sample has a modal
age of 35, an age group with rather good health status that has proven to opt for
higher deductibles in previous studies and o¢ cial statistics.
5.2 Estimation results from the DCE
Equation (5) is the simple core model traditionally used for DCE, in which marginal
utilities and hence WTP values do not depend on socioeconomic characteristics.
This random-e¤ects probit estimation results in highly signicant coe¢ cients with
the expected signs (Table 3). Therefore, it can be said that the six product attributes
distinguished proved relevant for choice. However, the highly signicant (negative)
constant provides evidence of status quo bias, i.e. the alternative is valued less
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than the status quo insurance contract as a general tendency (Samuelson and
Zeckhauser, 1988).
The two variables capturing cost sharing, viz. deductible and copayment, seem
to have di¤erent degrees of inuence on the choice decision. The negative coe¢ cient
of the deductible points to a decreasing likelihood of choosing an alternative if the
di¤erence in the deductibles between alternative and status quo is marked. This
result is intuitive, showing that individuals with a low current deductible are least
likely to opt for a very high-deductible alternative. However, the signicantly posi-
tive coe¢ cient of the squared deductible (deduct2) indicates that marginal disutility
decreases at high values of deductible.
Values of marginal WTP for the attributes can be derived from equations (6)
and (7). Estimates are shown in Table 4, with standard errors calculated using both
a bootstrap with 100 replications and the Delta method (STATA, 2004). The mar-
ginal WTP values for all contract attributes are highly signicant. In the following,
emphasis will be on the cost-sharing attributes.
Table 3
Random-effects probit estimation results for the DCE (simple model)
expected sign coefficient std.err. z-value marg. effect
deductible - -0.00057** 0.00003 -18.64 -0.00007
deductible2 +/- 3.80e-08** 7.88e-09 4.82 4.45e-09
copayment - -0.27058** 0.04282 -6.32 -0.03201
altmed a) + 0.35371** 0.04198 8.43 0.04265
generics - -0.19710** 0.04211 -4.68 -0.02334
innovation - -0.54942** 0.04807 -11.43 -0.06479
premium - -0.01431** 0.00061 -23.63 -0.00171
constant 0 -0.76362** 0.05893 -12.96
=us 0.91029, =r 0.45314
Log likelihood: -3134.5289
2? (0)   = 745.05 , Prob > 2?   = 0.0000
n = 9569
a) coding for alternative medicine (0=restriction; 1=expansion).
** (*) significant at the 1 (5) percent level.
Evidence on WTP for higher deductibles and copayments adds to the discus-
sion on cost sharing in Switzerland (Schellhorn, 2001;Werblow and Felder,
2003) and other European countries. While ex-ante rational individuals would want
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to limit their ex-post moral hazard by opting for a positive rate of coinsurance
(Zweifel and Breyer, 1997, Ch. 6), it is not clear how far away from zero the
optimal rate is in presence of a deductible and insurance premiums that are not fair
at the margin.
The results for the cost-sharing elements from the simple model (without control-
ling for socioeconomic variables, see equation (7)) read as follows (see Table 4). For
a median individual with a current CHF 400 deductible, an increase in the annual
deductible by CHF 1 has to be compensated with a monthly premium reduction
of 3.77 cents (s.e. 0.204 cents). Neglecting variation in risk aversion for extrapola-
tion, one can infer that the transition from a deductible of CHF 400 to CHF 1,500
would have to be compensated by a reduction of roughly CHF 38 in the monthly
premium.8 This compares favorably with the premium reduction actually granted,
which amounts to an average of about CHF 86 as of 2003.9 However, these resultss
only seem to apply to those individuals who opted for an alternative contract in the
DCE at least once. The signicant constant indicates a status quo bias that can be
expressed in monetary units as well. A compensation of CHF 53 is demanded to
consider a change in the insurance contract at all.10
Second, there is an estimatedWTP for avoiding a 20 percent rate of copayment of
CHF 19 (s.e. CHF 3.3). This is a relatively small amount, as shown by the following
calculation. Given a mean HCE of some CHF 2,500 paid by the insurers as of 2003
(BAG, 2005), an increase of the rate of coinsurance by 10 percentage points implies
an additional nancial exposure of CHF 250 on average. By way of comparison, an
increase of the deductible from CHF 400 to 1,500 must have a probability mass of no
more than 0.5 in view of the skewness of the cost distribution11, inducing a nancial
exposure of roughly CHF 475 [=0.5*(400+1500)/2]. This is 90 percent more than
the CHF 250 associated with the increased copayment; yet it must be compensated
by 100 percent more [=38/19]. Since copayment causes a higher variance of out-
8From equation (6) one can derive MWTPdeduct =
1+22deduct
7
and compute the WTP for a
higher deductible by integrating this function over the interval [400; 1500]:
R 1500
400
MWTPdeduct =
[ 1 0:01431 ( 0:00057  deduct+ 3:08e  08  deduct2]1500400 = 38:3:
9In spite of this favorable comparison, only 25 percent of respondents have the maximum
deductible (see Table 2).
10If the model is estimated only including those individuals that chose at least once one of the
alternatives proposed, the constant turns out to be insignicant. Computing again the compen-
sation for deviating from the status quo, a premium reduction of CHF 6 would be su¢ cient for
this group (estimation results for the reduced sample of switchersare given in Table A1 of the
Appendix).
11This distribution is conrmed by insurance data from one of the major Swiss health insurers.
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Table 4
Mean marginal WTP for attributes (in CHF per month) ? derived from the simple model
            WTP
std. err.
(bootstrapped)
std. err.
(by Delta method)
deductible a) -0.03770 *** 0.00204 0.00168
copayment -18.91 *** 3.30448 2.98148
altmed b) 24.71 *** 3.01507 3.10385
generics -13.77 *** 3.14571 3.06017
innovation -38.39 *** 3.36486 3.32203
a) compensation in Swiss Francs required for a CHF 1 increase in the annual deductible for the median individual.
b) coding for alternative medicine (0=restriction; 1=expansion).
*** significant at the 1 percent level.
1 CHF=0.8 US$ at 2005 exchange rates.
of-pocket outlay by the insured, it should be resisted more strongly by risk-averse
insured than a nancially equivalent deductible. However, the higher deductible
must be compensated somewhat more than proportionally.
The CHF 19 demanded to compensate for a 20 percent rather than 10 percent
rate of copayment cannot be juxtaposed directly to variations in actual premiums
because the present rate is set uniformly at 10 percent. However, it amounts to
about 8 percent of the sample average premium of CHF 240. Since a 10 percentage
point increase in the rate of copayment necessarily reduces insurance payments by at
least 10 percent (HCE borne by the insured plus mitigation of moral hazard e¤ects),
health insurers on average should be able to o¤er premium reductions of at least 10
percent, su¢ cient to overcome insuredsresistance against a moderate increase in
copayment.
5.3 Testing for preference heterogeneity
If heterogeneity of preferences plays an important role, market processes tend to-
wards a separating rather than a pooling equilibrium.12 Thus, it is important to
have evidence concerning the degree of preference heterogeneity in a population
12The characteristics determining choice decisions in health insurance are outlined in various
earlier studies. Schellhorn (2001), Werblow and Felder (2003), Lehmann and Zweifel
(2004), andHolly et al. (1998) analyze the exercise of choice in Swiss health insurance. For general
studies analyzing di¤erent health plan choices see e.g. Schwarze und Anderson (2001); Schut
et al. (2003); Strombom et al. (2002); Greß et al. (2002); Buchmueller and Feldstein
(1997).
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to be insured. To this end, a comprehensive model is estimated. The nature of
the random utility specication, viz. equations (3) and (4), requires the inclusion
of socioeconomic characteristics as interaction terms with the product attribute in
question. Di¤erences in utility causing choice may, however, not be fully determined
by di¤erences in attributes, but may be due to unobservable characteristics that are
captured in the constant. Control variables included are gender, age and income
(each in three categories), the actual monthly premium paid, household size, lan-
guage as a proxy for region and the concomitant premium di¤erences, and a proxy
variable for health status, i.e. whether the respondent has made use of outpatient
and/or inpatient care during the past 6 months. Selecting age as an example, equa-
tion (7) can thus be expanded to read
Vij = c+ 1deduct+ ::+ 7premium+ 15a2539  deduct+ :: (11)
+22a63
+  deduct+ ::+ 72a2539 + 73a63+ + ::+ "ij.
In this comprehensive specication, the socioeconomic characteristics entered at the
end can be interpreted as interaction terms involving the constant, pointing to a
misspecication if signicant. In the random utility model di¤erences are taken
between the two alternatives considererd, leading to a cancellation of individual
terms. If the specication in equation (11) was fully correct, the constant itself as
well as the socioeconomic variables should have a value of zero.
While the signs of the six product attributes continue to accord with theoretical
expectations (see Table A2 of the Appendix), copayment, altmed, generics, and
innovation lose statistical signicance. However, they retain (or come very close
to) 5 percent signicance in at least one interaction term. Thus the attributes,
with the exception of generics, can be said to still have empirical relevance in this
specication. Moreover, their estimated coe¢ cients are reasonably close to those
pertaining to the simple specication (see Table 3), with the only exception of
innovation.
Most importantly, Table A2 contains strong evidence of preference heterogeneity.
No less than 6 of the 14 regressors involving age are signicant, while gender di¤er-
ences can be ascertained in 3 out of 6 cases. The French-speaking minority clearly
is less concerned about delayed access to innovation than the rest of the population.
Out of a total of 14 interaction terms involving income, 6 are signicant (3 of them
very highly).
The di¤erences in WTP (derived from the comprehensive model of the Appendix
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using equation (6)) are documented in Table 5. Most of the estimates are highly
signicant with regard to an increase in the deductible (by CHF 1) but mostly
insignicant with regard to an increase in the rate of copayment (from 10 to 20
percent). The latter result is not surprising since the attribute copayment loses
signicance in the specication with interactions (see Table A2).
Male and older respondents (63+, with age groups 25-39, 40-62, 63+) demand a
lower compensation for a marginal increase in the deductible and require less com-
pensation for accepting 20 percent rate of copayment. As to income e¤ects, estimates
conform with theoretical expectations. Premium reductions would have to be high-
est for low-income individuals (4.4 cents per CHF, s.e. 1.9 cents). This amount
drops with increasing income, to 2.2 cents (s.e. 0.8 cents) per CHF additional de-
ductible. A similar tendency seems to hold with respect to copayment (WTP values
cannot be distinguished from zero, however). Individuals of the French-speaking
part of Switzerland su¤er a signicantly higher disutility from higher deductibles
(but possibly not from higher copayment). An astonishing result is that health
status (proxied by past utilization of medical services) does not make a di¤erence.
Individuals who have undergone treatment during the past 6 months demand the
same compensation for higher deductibles as healthyindividuals.
Finally, compensation demanded for accepting a still higher deductible increases
with the initial value of the deductible, conforming to theoretical expectations.
Conclusion 3 The simple (attributes-only) model yields estimation results that are
in full accordance with theoretical expectations. The comprehensive model (with in-
teractions) results in WTP estimates for increased deductibles that di¤er between
age and income groups, suggesting preference heterogeneity.
The heterogeneity in preferences with respect to higher deductibles can be traced
back to di¤erences in risk aversion whereas preferences for an ample coverage of
alternative medicine or a direct access to innovations are more likely to express a
taste for a di¤erentiated benet package, the latter being neglected in the following
analysis.
The comprehensive model controls for socioeconomic di¤erences that capture
the risk type of the insured to some extent. The di¤erences in compensations de-
manded between age groups or gender might thus be interpreted as an expression
of di¤erences in risk preferences. Figure 2 shows the di¤erences in the compensa-
tions demanded for higher deductibles between age groups and gender. They are
less marked in the lower ranges of deductibles, that were available in 2003. Young
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Table 5
Marginal WTP for deductible and coinsurance (in CHF per month) for selected socioeconomic groups (evaluated at the
group mean) ? derived from the comprehensive model
Deductiblea) Coinsurance
     WTP std.err. 95%-CI          WTP std.err. 95%-CI
Male -0.0293 *** 0.0105 [ -0.050 ; -0.009] -8.82 11.4908 [ -31.34 ;  13.70]
Female -0.0371 *** 0.0132 [ 0.063 ; -0.011] -16.75 * 9.7855 [ -35.92 ; 2.43]
Age 25-39 -0.0421 ** 0.0197 [ -0.081 ; -0.004] -20.16 16.5978 [ -52.69 ; 12.37]
Age 40-62 -0.0363 *** 0.0121 [ -0.060 ; -0.013] -15.57 10.6938 [ -36.53 ;  5.39]
Age over 62 -0.0192 *** 0.0058 [ -0.031 ; -0.008] -0.80 7.6650 [ -15.83 ; 14.22]
Income < CHF 1500b) -0.0445 ** 0.0193 [ -0.082 ; -0.007] -29.40 20.5578 [ -69.69 ;  10.89]
Income CHF 1500-3000 -0.0340 ** 0.0139 [ -0.061 ; -0.007] -10.14 9.3448 [ -28.46 ;  8.18]
Income CHF >3000 -0.0216 *** 0.0081 [ -0.038 ; -0.006] -10.52 13.0126 [ -36.03 ; 14.98]
German -0.0305 ** 0.0128 [ -0.056 ; -0.005] -14.70 * 8.5193 [ -31.39 ; 2.00]
French -0.0323 ** 0.0113 [ -0.010 ; -0.055] -8.89 12.4167 [ -33.22 ;  14.45]
Notreatc) -0.0337 ** 0.0135 [ -0.060 ; -0.007] -3.20 10.9393 [ -24.64 ; 18.24]
Treatc) -0.0325 *** 0.0105 [ -0.053 ; -0.012] -19.96 * 10.6883 [ -40.91 ;  0.98]
Current deductible 230 -0.0300 *** 0.0100 [ -0.050 ; -0.010] -13.69 9.5456 [ -32.39 ;  5.02]
Current deductible 400 -0.0311 *** 0.0107 [ -0.052 ; -0.010] -13.80 10.0267 [ -33.45 ; 5.86]
Current deductible 600 -0.0355 ** 0.0132 [ -0.061 ; -0.010] -12.21 10.7286 [ -33.24 ; 8.81]
Current deductible 1200 -0.0420 * 0.0216 [ -0.084 ;  0.001] -12.55 15.0386 [ -42.02 ;  16.93]
Current deductible 1500 -0.0364 *** 0.0136 [ -0.063 ; -0.010] -11.37 11.0013 [ -32.93 ; 10.19]
a) monthly compensation in Swiss Francs required for a CHF 1 increase in the annual deductible.
b) monthly per capita income.
c) use of hospital and/or ambulatory services during the past 6 months.
*** (**,*) significant at the 1 (5,10) percent level.
1 CHF=0.8 US$ at 2005 exchange rates.
individuals, men as well as women, demand lower compensations, and their disutil-
ity from going from CHF 400 to levels beyond about CHF 2,000 (one of the newly
introduced levels in 2005) does not increase as fast as that of the older age groups.
To change from the minimum level of CHF 230 to CHF 1,500 a 25 to 39-year-old
person (male and female combined) has to be compensated with a premium reduc-
tion of CHF 38 (maximum exposure of CHF 1,270), the 40 to 62-year-olds with
CHF 50, and the oldest with CHF 60. Again, the constant, now also specic to
socioeconomic characteristics, needs to be considered to control for willingness to
deviate from the status quo at all. The compensation demanded for the young and
the old can be computed relative to the reference group of the 40 to 62-year-old per-
sons. To consider a change of insurance contract elderly demand as much as CHF 22
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more monthly compensation than the mean individual of the reference group (CHF
57). The 25 to 39-year-old young are willing to change to an alternative contract if
they are compensated with CHF 46, which is CHF 11 less than the reference group.
Thus, the di¤erence between them young and old adds up to less than CHF 33 or
some 14 percent of average premium.
Figure 2
Demanded compensation for a higher annual deductible by age groups and gender, initial deductible CHF 230
                                      (a) Females                                             b) Males
The reductions asked for a deductible as high as CHF 2,500 are of particular
interest. They were not available (but debated) in 2003 when the DCE was elded
but constitute the new maximum e¤ective 2005. A person aged 25 to 39 with a mini-
mum deductible of CHF 230 would have to receive CHF 63, a 40 to 62-year-old CHF
82, respectively CHF 96 for the group of the over 62year-olds (additional maximum
exposure of CHF 2,270). This result indicates that looking only at marginal WTP
values distorts estimates of compensation demanded for high deductibles. For the
newly introduced deductible levels, risk preferences may play an important role for
the choice of a high-deductible plan. Since younger individuals have to be compen-
sated less for higher cost-sharing, they are predicted to be over-represented among
those who in fact opted for a deductible of CHF 2,500 in 2005 (5 percent, see Table
2) Still, predictions such as this one must be qualied by the fact that that the
23
control variables for health status and income are measured with considerable error.
5.4 Likelihood of choosing higher deductibles
Ideally, the results of DCE could be used to predict the holding of contracts with
deductibles in excess of the legal minimum. However, respondents cannot be traced
after the experiment. This leaves the possibility of explaining their choice of con-
tract some time before the experiment, resulting in postdiction rather than predic-
tion. The di¤erence between the two is not very important, however, because most
respondents will have the same contract one or two years after the time of the DCE.
Since DCE are about deviating from the status quo, it may be worthwile to
rst check whether respondents in fact have changed their health insurance in the
past. In the course of 5 years (i.e. 1999 to 2003), 77 percent of the sample did not
change their insurer, 20 percent changed once, and 2 percent changed more than
once. Respondents also changed the type of insurance. They can choose between
tradtionalcoverage with free access to all general practitioners and specialists or a
Managed-Care alternative, such as a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) or a
gatekeeping model. Additionaly, they have a choice between ve di¤erent deductible
levels. Overall, 66 percent have stayed with their previous insurance contract during
the 5 years preceding the DCE. Among respondents younger than 40, this gure
drops to 58 percent. Therefore, there seems to be some scope for postdiction.
In the DCE itself a total of 10,000 decisions could be made by the 1,000 individu-
als in the sample. 18 percent of these decisions were made in favor of the alternative,
rather than the status quo contract. This gure, while low at the rst sight, is around
the expected percentage for a DCE of such a high degree of complexity, entailing
considerable status quo bias among risk-averse and/or ambiguity-averse individuals
(Kunreuther et al., 1993; Telser, 2002, ch. 4.2; Telser et al., 2004). Moreover,
the relatively few changes that occur might be concentrated among few individuals
only, which would limit the predictive power of the DCE. However, only some 40
percent of the respondents never chose the alternative insurance contract. There-
fore, some 60 percent proved exible in that they deviated from their status quo at
least once.
This gure should not be taken as a predictor of actual choice behavior of the
Swiss population. It is known that actual decision making is subject to consid-
erable status quo bias that is especially marked for certain socioeconomic groups
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). Indeed, a binary probit model, with opting
at least once for the alternative as the dependent variable, resulted in signicantly
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negative coe¢ cients for age and being female but positive ones for education and
the current premium paid, indicating increased exibility (results not shown).
After these preliminary investigations, the actual choice of deductible prior to
DCE is analyzed using an ordered probit model. Ordered probit models allow to take
the ordinal nature of the di¤erent deductible levels into account without assuming
them to be equally spaced. Here, level 1 stands for the minimum deductible of CHF
230 (as of 2003), and level 5 for the maximum of CHF 1,500.
The likelihood of choosing a certain deductible level is driven by various ob-
servable socioeconomic variables si and unobservable factors "i (reecting e.g. risk
aversion) that are normally distributed by assumption. Individuals choose the de-
ductible level that maximizes their expected utility (Eu)
Eu [d] = si + "i; with (12)
d =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 if Eu  1
2 if 1 < Eu
  2
3 if 2 < Eu
  3
4 if 3 < Eu
  4
5 if Eu > 4;
where the f1; :::; 4g denote the expected utility thresholds that cause the individual
to choose the next higher deductible.
The individual probabilities [Pr()] of choosing a certain deductible level can be
expressed as follows,
Pr(d = 1) = [ si]
Pr(d = 2) = [1   si]  [ si]
Pr(d = 3) = [2   si]  [ si] (13)
Pr(d = 4) = [3   si]  [ si]
Pr(d = 5) = 1  [4   si];
where [] denotes a standardized normal cdf .
Estimation results pertaining to equation (13) are summarized in Table 6. The
likelihood of having choosen a deductible in excess of the legal minimum of CHF 230
generally increases signicantly with education, income, not making use of medical
services in the past 6 months (notreat), and household size. It signicantly decreases
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with age and a higher current premium. This last-mentioned e¤ect is puzzling at rst
sight but may be the consequence of parameters  not being allowed to vary across
segments. Therefore, if the propensity to choose the next higher deductible, while
positive on the whole, decreases strongly with premium above a certain threshold,
the pertinent prem may turn negative. The standard ordered probit model, however,
does not allow the sign of the marginal e¤ects to change more than once across the
various thresholds.13
Table 6
Results of the ordered probit model: actually chosen deductible
exp. sign coefficienta) std. err. z-value
age - -0.00912 *** 0.00279 -3.27
male +/- 0.15314 * 0.07858 1.87
french +/- 0.12344 ** 0.08577 2.20
incomeb) + 0.00011 *** 0.00003 4.16
education c) + 0.07516 *** 0.02434 2.98
premium - -0.00052 *** 0.00017 -3.21
notreat d) + 0.26838 *** 0.07815 3.84
household size + 0.12239 *** 0.03685 3.13
alternatives_in_dce + 0.12978 *** 0.02122 6.11
thresholds
1? (CHF 400) 0.35221 0.24324
2? (CHF 600) 0.99542 *** 0.24459
3?  (CHF 1200) 1.46215 *** 0.24595
4? (CHF 1500) 1.54629 *** 0.24625
Log-likelihood: -1142.72
2? (9) = 163.91, Prob > 2?  = 0.000
N = 865
a) STATA  computes marginal effects only for the probabilities of the thresholds.
b) monthly per capita income.
c) primary school=1, university=7.
d) in the past 6 months
***(**,*) significant at the 1 (5,10) percent level.
Evidence for a changing marginal e¤ect is given in Table 7. They do change signs
between the deductibles of CHF 400 and CHF 600. Insured with high deductibles
13For a more general formulation of ordered probit models see Boes andWinkelmann (2005).
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are less likely to react to a high current premium by opting for a still higher de-
ductible. This nding is supported the language e¤ect, french = 1 is associated
with an increased propensity to have a deductible of CHF 600 or higher. But it is
in the French-speaking part of Switzerland, that premiums are higher due to higher
costs of the (cantonal) health systems. Income also has the expected e¤ect, with a
marked likelihood of opting for high-deductible plans as per capita income of the
household increases. This reects the ambiguity of theoretical predictions (Zweifel
and Eisen, 2004, ch. 3.6.2). On the one hand, demand for safety should increase
with income and wealth. On the other hand, absolute risk aversion may decrease
with wealth, causing WTP for insurance coverage to decrease as well. It is this
second e¤ect that seems to dominate here, resulting in an increased propensity of
higher-income respondents to have a contract with a high deductible. The marginal
e¤ects seem to be small at a rst sight; however, CHF 1,000 more income per capita
are predicted to reduce the likelihood of choosing the minimum deductible by 4
percentage points and to increase the likelihood of opting for the highest deductible
level by 3 percentage points.
Table 7
Marginal probability effects of the deductible choice (for selected characteristics from the ordered probit model)
level of deductible
(in CHF)
current premium french alternatives_in_dce income a)
d = 230 0.00020 *** -0.06819 ** -0.04777 *** -0.00004 ***
d = 400 0.00001 -0.00528 -0.00239 * -2.02e-06 *
d = 600 -0.00004 *** 0.01356 ** 0.01005 *** 8.51e-06 ***
d = 1200 -0.00001 ** 0.00348 ** 0.00247 *** 2.09e-06 ***
d = 1500 -0.00016 *** 0.05643 ** 0.03764 *** 0.00003 ***
a) monthly per capita income.
***(**,*) significant at the 1 (5,10) percent level.
The explanatory variable alternatives_in_dce is of particular interest because
it directly links the actual choices of respondents to the DCE.14 Its highly signicant
positive sign indicates that those individuals who made more choices in favor of a
proposed alternative are also more likely to opt for a higher deductible plan. For
14Since the decision in the DCE is most likely driven by the same personal characteristics of
the individuals a problem of endogeneity might arise. However, due to the lack of adequate
instruments an estimation of two-step model was not considered. Potential measurement errors
might lead to a more severe bias.
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example having opted for the alternative one additional time lets the probability
of having a deductible of CHF 600 rather than a lower increase by 1 percentage
point (see Table 6). This e¤ect even increases with higher deductibles, reaching a
maximum of 3.8 percentage points at CHF 1,500 (Table 7).
Conclusion 4 The information contained in the choices made in the course of the
market experiment contribute to the explanation of actual contract choice. The ef-
fect of preference heterogeneity, while important, cannot unambiguously be separated
from those related to the initial risk type of individuals.
The results suggest that Swiss health insurers may hope to attract e.g. young,
male, and higher-income individuals by o¤ering contracts with higher deductibles.
Interpreting the results from DCE, however, indicates that launching policies di¤er-
entiated in terms of cost sharing cannot be seen as a fail-safe instrument of risk selec-
tion. Other preferences, notably regarding access to care (as evidenced in Zweifel
et al., 2005), the comprehensiveness of benets that are not captured in this DCE
may play an important role in the actual choice of health insurance.
6 Conclusions
Asymmetric information plays an important role in any health insurance setting.
The standard Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) model suggests that o¤ering di¤erentiated
contracts allows to separate high risks from low risks. However, in mandatory so-
cial health insurance schemes, insurers are prevented from solving this information
problem. Neither the supply of di¤erentiated contracts in order to overcome ad-
verse selection nor the implementation of risk-rated premiums to equalize expected
prot margins are usually permitted. However, product di¤erentiation would al-
low to cater to the di¤erentiated preferences of the insured not only with regard to
di¤erences in expected future HCE, but also due to di¤erences in preferences for
health insurance coverage, So far, there has been limited evidence concerning such
heterogeneity supporting this claim (Conclusion 1).
In the case of Switzerland, some elements of choice, mainly with respect to cost
sharing, have already been implemented since the introduction of the Health Insur-
ance Law in 1996, with an increasing number of individuals opting for an alternative
insurance contract. The present study seeks to analyze the choice behavior of di¤er-
ent socioeconomic groups for various cost-sharing elements within Swiss social health
insurance and to determine the extent to which insurers may use deductibles as an
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instrument for risk selection. They certainly have an incentive to do so (Conclusion
2). Ever since the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) model, the prediction has been that
individuals in a better health condition are more likely to opt for high-deductible
plans.
In a discrete-choice experiment (DCE), 1,000 Swiss individuals of a representative
sample were given the hypothetical choice of alternative insurance contracts that
di¤ered both in terms of deductibles and copayments and in benets covered. Utility
losses for accepting a higher deductible or copayment are expressed by willingness-
to-pay (WTP) values. A simple model including contract attributes only proved
highly signicant, with a higher deductible or rate of copayment serving to lower the
likelihood of choosing the alternative. However, at the margin disutility decreases
at high values of deductible. An increase in the deductible or a higher rate of
copayment of 20 rather than 10 percent causes respondents to shy away from the
alternatives as well.
Theoretical considerations suggest that compensation required may be di¤erent
between socioeconomic groups. In order to test for preference heterogeneity, a com-
prehensive model including seven socioeconomic characteristics was estimated. The
premium reduction required for voluntarily accepting a higher degree of cost shar-
ing is derived for various socioeconomic groups. Results show that compensation
demanded does di¤er between age and income groups, pointing to heterogeneity in
preferences (Conclusion 3). Contrary to expectations, no evidence was found with
respect to health status. Whether an insured has received medical services during
the past 6 months or not does not seem to inuence the premium reduction de-
manded. These ndings suggest that rened cream skimming through di¤erentiated
deductibles may not be possible.
An analysis of the data with respect to compensation demanded for higher de-
ductibles is especially interesting in the light of newly introduced higher deductibles,
e¤ective 2005. Besides mitigating moral hazard e¤ects, these additional cost-sharing
schemes (CHF 2,000 and 2,500 deductibles) might allow insurers to improve on their
risk selection e¤orts. This potential is even magnied by the fact that not every
insurer is obliged to o¤er all possible deductible plans but can rather concentrate
on a few, possibly resulting in separating contracts. Compensations demanded to
take additional risk and change to an insurance contract with a high deductible are
smaller for young and male individuals with amounts that are in a realistic range of
the regulated premium reductions insurers are allowed to concede (Figure 2).
Results of an odered probit model for the choice of deductible indicate that
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sociodemographic characteristics are determinants of the probability of choosing a
certain deductible. However, these inuences cannot be fully distinguished from
those emanating from risk types (Conclusion 4). For example, higher-income indi-
viduals maybe higher risk-types (if demanding higher-quality treatment) or lower
risk types (if excerting more preventive e¤ort). In addition, low risks might be-
come high risks over time and vice versa, making it di¢ cult for insurers to precisely
separate the various risk classes over an extended planning horizon. Finally, the
possibility of the insured to change contract or insurer every year puts limits on
payo¤s from risk selection by insurers.
In sum, while this study does not provide clear evidence for cream skimming
by Swiss health insurers the di¤erences in WTP values derived from DCE point
to risk or preference heterogeneity that faciliates cream skimming through o¤ering
innovative health plans. Even though only a minority will be attracted, there is
potential for more di¤erentiated contracts with higher deductibles since compen-
sation o¤ered in the guise of premium reductions can often be nanced from cost
savings. However, even if di¤erentiated cost-sharing provisions may serve as an in-
strument for risk selection, they do serve heterogenous preferences and may thus
well be e¢ ciency-enhancing overall.
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A Appendix
Table A1
Random-effects probit estimation results for the DCE (simple model), only ?switchers? a)
exp. sign coefficient std. err. z-value marg. effect
deductible - -0.00043 ***  0.00003 -14.83 -0.00043
deductible2 +/-   1.01e-08 7.73e-09   1.31  1.01e-08
copayment - -0.32582 *** 0.04369 -7.46 -0.3258
altmed b) +   0.40551 *** 0.04266   9.51  0.40551
generics - -0.24807 *** 0.04289 -5.78 -0.24807
innovation - -0.56158 *** 0.04710 -11.92 -0.56158
premium - -0.01310 ***  0.00060 -21.90 -0.01310
constant 0 -0.08108 0.05305 -1.53
=us 0.04005***, =r 0.16843***
Log likelihood: -2616.4952
2? (0)  =125.61, Prob > 2?  = 0.0000
n=5823
a) only those individuals who opted at least once for an alternative contract.
b) coding for alternative medicine (0=restriction; 1=expansion).
***(**,*) significant at the 1 (5, 10) percent level.
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Table A2
Random-effects probit etsimation resualts for the DCE (comprehensive model)
exp. sign     coefficient std. err. z-value
deductible - -0.00085 *** 0.00012 -6.87
deductible2 +/- 1.12e-07 *** 0.00000 3.53
copayment - -0.33744 * 0.18286 -1.85
altmed a) + 0.28399 0.18338 1.55
generics - -0.07629 0.17453 -0.44
innovation - -0.00488 0.21739 -0.02
premium - -0.01508 *** 0.00273 -5.53
a2539*deduct + 6.75e-05 6.81e-05 0.99
a2539*deduct2 +/- -1.15e-08 1.83e-08 -0.63
a2539*copay + -0.03366 0.09941 -0.34
a2539*altmed + 0.12122 0.09702 1.25
a2539*generics + -0.01993 0.09753 -0.20
a2539*innovation -0.23113 ** 0.11262 -2.05
a2539*premium -0.00322 ** 0.00141 -2.29
a63+*deduct +/- 0.00020 ** 0.00010 1.93
a63+*deduct2 +/- -1.44e-08 2.55e-08 -0.56
a63+*copay - 0.26306 ** 0.13380 1.97
a63+*altmed +/- -0.23687 * 0.13096 -1.81
a63+*generics +/- 0.03280 0.13152 0.25
a63+*innovation +/- 0.10810 0.14908 0.73
a63+*premium - 0.00543 ** 0.00183 2.97
male*deduct + 0.00015 *** 6.41e-05 2.34
male*deduct2 +/- -2.88e-08 * 1.69e-08 -1.71
male*copay + 0.08336 0.09139 0.91
male*altmed - -0.16156 * 0.08891 -1.82
male*generics + -0.08908 0.08939 -1.00
male*innovation + 0.04951 0.10253 0.48
male*premium +/- 0.00187 0.00128 1.46
french*deduct +/- 2.89e-05 7.07e-05 0.41
french*deduct2 +/- -1.38e-08 1.91e-08 -0.72
french*copay +/- 0.13053 0.10135 1.29
french*altmed +/- -0.06019 0.09856 -0.61
french*generics +/- -0.07649 0.09841 -0.78
french*innovation +/- 0.24711 ** 0.11308 2.19
french*premium +/- 0.00215 0.00141 1.53
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?Table A2 continued
rich*deduct + 0.00028 *** 9.01e-05 3.07
rich*deduct2 +/- -7.42e-08 *** 2.65e-08 -2.79
rich*copay + -0.02325 0.09885 -0.24
rich*altmed + 0.18744 * 0.10506 1.78
rich*generics + 0.09924 0.10221 0.97
rich*innovation + 0.21166 * 0.11320 1.87
rich*premium + 0.00131 0.00148 0.88
poor*deduct - -0.00027 *** 0.00011 -2.54
poor*deduct2 +/- 6.45e-08 ** 2.76e-08 2.34
poor*copay - -0.18372 0.14008 -1.31
poor*altmed - 0.00578 0.13762 0.04
poor*generics - -0.06435 0.13977 -0.46
poor*innovation - 0.06104 0.16089 0.38
poor*premium - 0.00319 0.00198 1.62
hh*deduct - 4.55e-05 2.84e-05 1.60
hh*deduct2 +/- -1.63e-08 ** 7.51e-09 -2.16
hh*copay - -0.01334 0.04310 -0.31
hh*altmed + 0.06510 0.04235 1.54
hh*generics +/- -0.00556 0.04229 -0.13
hh*innovation - -0.06685 0.04830 -1.38
hh*premium - -0.00035 0.00061 -0.58
notreat*deduct + 8.46e-05 6.50e-05 1.30
notreat*deduct2 +/- -7.73e-09 1.71e-08 -0.45
notreat*copay + 0.29779 *** 0.09277 3.21
notreat*altmed + 0.16860 * 0.09023 1.87
notreat*generics + -0.09656 0.09067 -1.06
notreat*innovtion + 0.11189 0.10367 1.08
notreat*premium - -0.00080 0.00130 -0.62
prem_pd*deduct - -3.12e-07 2.81e-07 -1.11
prem_pd *deduct2 -/+ 1.39e-11 7.59e-11 0.18
prem_pd *copay - -0.00022 0.00039 -0.56
prem_pd *altmed - -0.00065 * 0.00039 -1.65
prem_pd *generics - -0.00046 0.00033 -1.37
prem_pd *innovovation - -0.00094 * 0.00052 -1.80
prem_pd *premium - -3.61e-06 6.29e-06 -0.57
a2539 0 0.13103 0.13352 0.98
a63+ 0 -0.46353 *** 0.17655 -2.63
male 0 -0.05830 0.13744 -0.42
french 0 -0.11770 0.15083 -0.78
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Table A2 continued?
rich 0 -0.10998 0.13653 -0.81
poor 0 0.05966 0.20956 0.28
hhsize 0 0.00957 0.05781 0.17
notreatment 0 -0.18403 0.12322 -1.49
prem_pd 0 0.00068 0.00043 1.57
constant 0 -0.87395 *** 0.23906 -3.66
=us 0.91029, =r 0.45314
Log likelihood: -2964.4978
2? (0)  =697.45, Prob > 2?  = 0.0000
N  = 9334
a) coding for alternative medicine (0=restriction; 1=expansion).
*** (**,*) significant at the 1 (5, 10) percent level
0: predicted to be insignificant in a random utility model
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